Syria: The Road to Geneva – and back again
The suspense
over the holding of the Geneva II Conference on Syria appeared to have finally
ended on 18 January with the decision of the principal opposition group – the
Syrian National Coalition (SNCo) – to attend, but has now re-emerged with their
threat to withdraw over the extension of an invitation to Iran.
However I
don’t think there is as much uncertainty as is widely thought. The UN
has already taken out insurance by inviting a wide range of states
to participate – a total of 32 – effectively turning it into an international
conference on Syria, rather than a purely bilateral peace negotiation, and virtually ensuring
that some sort of international deliberation on Syria will commence on 22
January.(The
first day will involve all the participating delegations in preliminary
discussions, with bilateral negotiations mediated by Brahimi starting
on the 24th).
Moreover the
US and the “Friends of Syria” are putting intense pressure on the SNCo to
attend, while at the same time Russia has been doing its best to woo them,given the limitations imposed by its betrothal to the Asad regime. The hesitations
of the SNCO are conditioned more by its need to reassure various forces
back home than expressing any real uncertainty about its eventual
participation.
So what are
the intentions of the main players at Geneva II and what, if anything can we
expect to emerge from it.? And how should the international movement of
Solidarity with the Syrian revolution be responding?
The Godfathers – the US and Russia
The United
States and Russia share a common concern to avoid instability in a complex and
inter-twined region and to contain the development of international “terrorist”
forces. The US’s parochial obsession with any whiff of “al-Qaeda” (9/11 casts a
long and deep shadow) has prevented it from adopting a consistent strategy towards
the Syrian conflict and limited its support for the anti-Asad forces to either
tokenistic light weaponry or indirect assistance via partners such as Saudi
Arabia. Russia, of course, has the additional motivation of wanting to support
an historic ally that plays an important role in providing it with influence in
an important geo-strategic region and counter-balancing US global hegemony.
What this
means is that both the US and Russia have a real interest in seeing Geneva II produce
some kind of negotiated resolution of
the conflict, and both are more concerned with regional order and stability than
with meeting the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people.
The Regime
The Syrian
regime has been pressured into this process by its Russian patrons. Throughout
the course of the conflict the regime has repeatedly insisted that it will not
negotiate with “terrorists” – and since it has labelled anyone who actively
opposes it as a “terrorist” that has meant a refusal to negotiate with anyone
except itself. It entered into the Geneva process in the hope that the
opposition would refuse to participate, allowing it to present a charade of
openness to peace-making while not actually having to give any ground. To try
and ensure that outcome it launched a provocative intensification in the bombardment of opposition areas on the eve of a mooted peace process.
The regime’s
prime tactic for the Conference is to try and refocus discussion on the issue
of “combatting terrorism” rather than its own repressive record and the demands
for real political change. This is an operation which may play well with some
of the participants in the opening round, but is going to quickly run out of
steam once serious, bi-lateral negotiations begin on 24 January.
The
delegation appointed by Asad reflects this approach. It is headed by a
regime hard-liner – the Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Walid Muallem who, along
with his deputy Faisal Mikdad, has been making public pronouncements insisting that
Asad will be standing for re-election in 2014. To further ensure that loyalty
to the President is not overlooked in these proceedings, Asad’s notorious
“Political and Media Advisor” Bouthaina Shabaan, is named as a “Deputy Head”of
the delegation. The remainder are a combination of foreign ministry officials
and spin doctors, with no one included who might be able to contribute to practical peace-making arrangements.
On top of
that, they have hedged their bets in several ways. Muallem has sent a letter to the UN General Secretary in which he expresses reservations about
the Geneva framework; and he has emphasized that anything agreed at Geneva
would be subject to a referendum (presided over by the regime and
its security apparatuses – whose outcome would therefore be of their choosing).
The Ghost of Geneva I
In order to
understand the possible dynamic of any Geneva II negotiations we need to remind
ourselves of the content of the June 2012 Geneva Communique on which they are
based. This calls for:
The establishment of a transitional governing body which ... would exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the present government and the opposition and other groups and shall be formed on the basis of mutual consent.…The public services must be preserved or restored. This includes the military forces and security services.All parties must cooperate with the transitional governing body in ensuring the permanent cessation of violence. This includes completion of withdrawals and addressing the issue of the disarming, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups. (my emphasis)
This
insistence on maintaining core regime institutions is based on supposed lessons
drawn from the US occupation of Iraq, where the occupation authorities’
sweeping dismissal of Baathist military and state personnel led to political
chaos and insurgency. However it is based on false reasoning,
since the structure of power in a Syria in the midst of an hypothetical “negotiated
transition” would be totally different to that of Iraq in the wake of a sweeping
military defeat.What this
formula envisages is essentially a “Zimbabwe” solution: one in which an
authoritarian regime and a democratic opposition are welded together without
any modification of the underlying institutional power structures. The outcome is
entirely predictable: the opposition gets an upgrade in desks and limousines;
the regime gets to hang on to power.
Such an
approach to the Syrian situation, far from facilitating a peaceful transition, is
a piece of nonsense that guarantees the failure of Geneva II under even the
most optimistic scenario.
Diplomats in Wonderland
Let’s just
try and envisage for a moment how it would play out in practice. Coming out of Geneva there would
be a new government drawn at best 50% from the regime, 50% from the opposition.
With the Syrian Arab Army being kept in place, that would mean the Ministry of
Defence going to a regime General. Perhaps it would be balanced by the Ministry
of the Interior going to the opposition – with “full executive power” over
Syria’s four separate intelligence agencies and 85 000 secret policemen? But as
life-time Asad loyalists these professional torturers are not going to take
orders from just anyone: they will create their own chain of command –to the
president if Asad is left in office; to the nearest Baathist minister if he is
not. The result would be an administration split down the middle on political
lines, with a Baathist faction having at its disposal the repressive machinery
of the state, the remnants of the Baath Party, and associated government
officials; meanwhile the opposition
would be reduced to waving about bits of paper proclaiming their “full
executive authority”. And in the midst of all this someone will be rushing
around trying to persuade the armed opposition to surrender their weapons. With
Iraq in mind, one is reminded of Marx’s aphorism that history repeats itself
“first as tragedy, then as farce” – except in this case it would be both
tragedy and farce.
This
demonstrates why the question of removing Asad from the picture is so crucial –
it’s not a matter of personalities or moral condemnation, but of realistic power
politics: Asad in office means the regime in power, whatever the bits of paper
may say.
Getting Real
While this package
sounds very disturbing, in reality we can relax a bit – it is so full of
contradictions and absurdities that it has no hope of getting off the ground.
But that still leaves two big questions – how quickly will it fall apart? And
who is going to be hardest hit by the fall- out when it does come crashing
down?
There could
be opportunities here for a cohesive opposition with skilled negotiators. The
process of negotiation has its own logic, and it should be possible to exploit this
Mad Hatters Tea party to win some breathing space for the Syrian people, by
insisting on easing the sieges, stopping bombardments of civilian areas, and
releasing detainees as essential confidence-building measures before serious
talk can begin. It would be hard for the regime and its patrons to dismiss such
demands out of hand without losing all credibility – and this under the intense
gaze of 30+ diplomatic missions and the world press.
However the
Syrian National Coalition is neither politically skilled nor cohesive, (although
one interesting development in the opposition camp has been the emergence of a
group of Syrian Women who seem to have a clearer focus and greater cohesion.
While they are peripheral to the main process they seem to have the ear of
Brahimi and may be able to have some impact even from the fringes.)
Role of the Solidarity Movement.
How then
should the international solidarity movement be responding to this situation? I think the first objective should be to focus
attention on the issues I have referred to above: the sieges and bombardment of
opposition areas, and release of detainees. We should be highlighting voices from within Syria who are raising these demands; If this can be synchronised with
some Syrian voices at Geneva so much the better.
The second
objective is to prepare for the collapse of Geneva II: this is going to be
followed by a tidal wave of spin from the regime and its patrons, who will try
and place the blame on the opposition – both those at Geneva and those waging
the struggle back home. The regime is going to try and emerge from Geneva
smelling of roses; we need to ensure that it comes out smelling of the dung
heap of repression.